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Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.:
A Perfect Storm of Extraterritoriality in
Patent and Antitrust Law
BENJAMIN HOLT*
ABSTRACT
The invention of chemically embossed cushioned vinyl flooring
revolutionized the flooring industry in the mid-1900s, and the patents on
this technology became the basis for large-scale litigation between two of
the industry's leaders. This is the story of Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp.-a case that implicated foreign patent rights and the
territorial nature of patent law, the extraterritorial scope of U.S.
antitrust law (at a time when this scope was changing and uncertain),
competing doctrines of jurisdiction and abstention, and emerging
international comity concerns. These legal issues combined to create a
perfect storm of extraterritoriality by presenting unique, complex
questions about how they should interact and fit together in a global
context. This Note explores the historical and legal circumstances that
led to the case and argues that the Third Circuit erred by not applying
the act of state doctrine to the grant of a foreign patent and by instead
formulating a new comity abstention doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
Vinyl flooring is neither a common nor an exciting topic in everyday
conversation. However, it was a conflict between two leaders in the
flooring industry over vinyl flooring that resulted in one of the most
interesting and complex patent cases of the twentieth century:
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Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.' This case arose over foreign
patents covering revolutionary flooring technologies and involved
complicated questions regarding the application of United States law in
foreign countries. However, the Third Circuit provided a means for
abstaining from exercising jurisdiction in the case by creating a new
abstention doctrine based on principles of international comity, and the
court declined to apply the act of state doctrine to the foreign patents.
This Note's objectives are to tell the story of how a combination of
patent law and antitrust law in a global context in Mannington Mills,
Inc. created a perfect storm of extraterritoriality and to argue that the
court should have applied the act of state doctrine rather than creating
a new abstention doctrine based on principles of international comity.
This Note will begin by providing historical context for the case,
including descriptions of the parties, the judges, the patents, and the
significance of the case. Next, the legal context of the case will be
explained, including: (1) the foreign licensing issues that led to the
litigation, (2) the procedural history of the case and a brief outline of the
Mannington Mills, Inc. opinion, and (3) an explanation of how the case
presented a perfect storm of extraterritoriality.
Then, this Note will argue that, if the court was going to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction in Mannington Mills, Inc., it should have
employed the act of state doctrine rather than have created a new
comity abstention doctrine. This argument is based on the following
assertions: that the act of state doctrine should be applied to foreign
patents, that the creation of a comity abstention doctrine led to further
confusion of the Sherman Act's extraterritorial jurisdiction, and that the
act of state doctrine provided the Third Circuit with a more practical
and, in hindsight, proper means of abstention.
This Note then concludes with a look at two factors that may have
potentially contributed to the Third Circuit's decision to use the comity
abstention doctrine rather than the act of state doctrine: a desire by the
Third Circuit to shape the changing landscape of extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and an inherent bias by courts in
favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
1. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE PLAYERS AND THE PATENTS
A. The Parties: Mannington Mills and Congoleum
Mannington Mills, Incorporated was a private, family-owned, U.S.
company in the flooring industry.2 Mannington Mills had several major
setbacks in the first half of the twentieth century,3 but by the 1960s, the
Mannington family business was doing very well and Mannington Mills
was beginning to be recognized as a leader in the floor covering
industry.4 For example, in 1957, Mannington Mills started production of
twelve-foot rotogravure vinyl felt-base floor covering, a venture that had
never been attempted before but "was overwhelmingly successful" and
"really rocked the industry."5
Congoleum Corporation was also a U.S. company in the flooring
industry, but unlike Mannington Mills, Congoleum was a public
company that had been involved in many mergers and acquisitions
throughout its history.6 In further contrast with Mannington Mills,
Congoleum was a major player in the floor covering industry throughout
the first half of the twentieth century but had fallen on hard times by
the early 1960s as sales dropped.7 Congoleum actually lost money in
1957, 1958, 1960, and 1961.8 Congoleum was accused of being "moth-
eaten" and its floor coverings described as "dogs" during a shareholders'
meeting in 1960 after the company's annual dividend had been
suspended two years prior.9 However, just when it seemed as though
2. See Company History, MANNINGTON MLlS, INC., http://www.mannington.com/
Corporate/OurCompany/History (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Company History,
MANNINGTON MILLS, INC.]. Mannington Mills is currently under its fourth generation of
private, family-ownership and just recently celebrated its centennial. See also Mannington
Mills, Inc., Mannington Centennial Video, YoUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBltFsC3pJk (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
3. See Mannington, Company History, supra note 2 ('Mannington survived two
catastrophic fires[] . . . a blizzard-related roof collapse[, ... two World Wars, the Great
Depression, and several other major economic downturns.").
4. See MANNINGTON MILLS, INC., OUR FIRST 75 YEARS: THE HISTORY OF MANNINGTON
MILLS (1990) [hereinafter OUR FIRST 75 YEARS] (discussing the history of the Mannington
Mills, including changes in company policy, leadership, and manufacturing techniques).
5. Id. ("Work continued on the new 12-foot rotogravure vinyl plant and equipment...
Vinyl-Tex was introduced at the January 1958 Chicago Floor Covering market. It was
overwhelmingly successful and it 'really rocked the industry."').
6. See Robert Halasz, Congoleurm Corp., in 18 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
COMPANY HISTORIES 116, 116-18 (Jay P. Pederson ed., 1997). Congoleum Corp. has
undergone several name changes throughout its history, but all such business entities will
be referred to hereinafter as merely "Congoleum."
7. See id. at 116-17.
8. See id. at 117.
9. Id.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
Congoleum was sure to lose its place of prominence in the flooring
industry, Congoleum made the discovery of the century (as far as vinyl
flooring is concerned).
B. The Judges: Weis, Weiner, and Adams
The opinion in Mannington Mills, Inc. was written by Circuit Judge
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., which made him a sought-after member of many
international legal forums.1 0 Judge Weis also authored a number of
important opinions in the field of legal ethics.' Judge Weis was "from a
family strongly imbued with legal tradition."12 His father was a
prominent trial attorney who inspired Judge Weis's path into the legal
profession,' 3 and even after being granted senior status on the Third
Circuit, Judge Weis continued to "profess great reverence" for his
father.' 4 Judge Weis studied law at the University of Pittsburgh, a path
subsequently followed by two of his brothers, his son, and two of his
nephews.' 5 Shortly after graduating from law school, Judge Weis
realized a lifelong dream when he partnered with his father to form
Weis and Weis, a father-and-son law firm. 16 Judge Weis's three younger
brothers later joined the firm, "creating a thriving family enterprise."'17
District Judge Charles R. Weiner joined Judge Weis in his opinion.
Judge Weiner was an "affable and fast-talking judge."'8 He had a
legendary talent for settling cases and gained national attention when
he was assigned in 1991 to handle all pending asbestos-related lawsuits,
which included more than 100,000 cases at that time. 19 Judge Weiner
10. See Pitt Alumni Association Names 2011 Distinguished Alumni Fellows, UNIV.
PITTSBURGH (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.news.pitt.edu/news/pitt-alumni-association-
names-201 1-distinguished-alumni-fellows.
11. Id.
12. Carol Los Mansmann, Joseph F. Weis, Jr., A Gentlemanly Scholar, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 923, 926 (1988).
13. See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 329 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle
Phelps eds., 2d ed. 2004).
14. Mansmann, supra note 12, at 926.
15. Mark A. Nordenberg, Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr.: A Humble Hero, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 931, 931 (1988).
16. See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 13, at 329.
17. Id.
18. Shannon P. Duffy, Charles Weiner, Federal Judge, Dead at Age 83, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=900005440948?
keywords=Federal+Judge&publication=The+Legal+InteUigencer.
19. See id.
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never lost his love of education, earning both a master's degree and a
doctorate while serving on the court.2
0
Circuit Judge Arlin M. Adams wrote the concurring opinion in
Mannington Mills, Inc. Throughout his career, Judge Adams developed
a national reputation as a "go-to mediator and investigator in high-
profile legal matters."21 He considered himself a conservative on the
bench but a liberal on civil rights.22 Judge Adams was on the short list
three times for a seat on the United States Supreme Court, 23 one time
being "told to wait by the phone for a call, which never came."24 Though
Judge Adams was not one to give up easily (for example, he gorged on
bananas and ice cream for sixty days to gain weight for acceptance into
the Navy after Pearl Harbor), he eventually gave up his pursuit for a
seat on the Supreme Court because "he was unwilling to put his family
through the process again," a process that had involved federal agents
going so far as to question his mother's fellow nursing home patients as
part of his background check. 25 Still, despite his great success, Judge
Adams remained a humble man, choosing to ride buses rather than
limousines, to eat home-packed lunches at his desk, and to sit in the
coach section on flights, even when traveling to advise the government
of Sri Lanka on drafting its constitution.
26
C. The Patents
In the mid-1900s, sheets of resinous composition were widely used
as decorative and wear-resistant coverings for floors, and it was
common practice to emboss the surface of such sheets to give added
decorative appeal and utility.2 7 Traditionally, this embossing process
was done with an embossing roll or plate which had to be engraved or
otherwise treated to create the desired design in raised relief on the
20. Gayle Ronan Sims, Charles R. Weiner, 83, Federal Judge, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 12,
2005), http://articdes.philly.com/2005-11-12/news/25432099_1_settlement-plan-asbestos-
lawsuits-public-servant.
21. Marc J. Zucker, Arlin Adams, Federal Judge and Community Champion, Dies at
94, FORWARD (Dec. 22, 2015), http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/327753/arlin-adams-
federal-judge-and-community-champion-dies-at-94/.
22. Sam Roberts, Arlin Adams, Federal Judge Three Times on Supreme Court Short




24. E. N. Carpenter, II, A Conversation with Judge Collins J. Seitz, Sr., DEL. LAW., Fall
1998, at 24, 33.
25. Roberts, supra note 22.
26. Zucker, supra note 21.
27. See U.S. Patent No. 3,293,094 col. 11. 23-26, 33-35 (filed Dec. 20, 1965).
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sheet's surface, wherein it was necessary to heat the sheet or embossing
surface and to press the design into the heat-softened sheet.28
In 1962, however, Congoleum introduced chemically embossed
cushioned vinyl flooring that was the first of its kind.29 This invention
allowed for the production of a large range of resinous sheet products
with embossed surfaces by simply applying a certain chemical to the
surface in a desired design and then heating the composition to
selectively decompose the chemical such that the resulting product is
depressed or raised where the chemical was apphed.30 Congoleum's new
vinyl flooring product was advertised as having "the cushiony softness,
warmth and quiet of carpeting." 31 On December 20, 1966, Congoleum
revolutionized the flooring industry when it received two patents 32 for
chemically embossed cushioned vinyl floor covering. 33
After the release of Congoleum's new product, Mannington Mills
started its own research in June 1964 to determine if it could make a
comparable cushioned vinyl floor product.34 Mannington Mills continued
this research even after Congoleum's patents were issued, but
Mannington Mills admits that its "product wasn't as good as
Congoleum's [product] and it was more expensive to produce."35
D. Impact of the Patents and Litigation
Congoleum's method of chemically embossing vinyl flooring had a
profound impact on the floor covering industry. Even though
Congoleum's new technology was patented, other businesses in the
flooring industry, such as Mannington Mills, had to sell the product if
they wished to stay relevant. It was no surprise that by the end of 1966,
the year that Congoleum's patents were issued, Mannington Mills and
28. See id. at col. 11. 51-56.
29. See Halasz, supra note 6, at 117.
30. '094 Patent at col. 2 1. 60-72, col. 3 1. 1-2.
31. See Halasz, supra note 6, at 117.
32. See '094 Patent; U.S. Patent No. 3,293,108 (filed Oct. 22, 1965).
33. See OUR FIRST 75 YEARS, supra note 4 ("A research project was started in June
1964 to 'determine if [Mannington] could make a cushioned vinyl floor product.' But
Congoleum was also doing research and they revolutionized the industry in 1966 when
they received a patent for in-register, chemically embossed, cushioned vinyl floor
covering."); Halasz, supra note 6, at 117; '094 Patent; '108 Patent.
34. See OUR FIRST 75 YEARS, supra note 4 ("A research project was started in June
1964 to 'determine if [Mannington] could make a cushioned vinyl floor product."').
35. Id. ('2Mannington continued their research efforts, but the product wasn't as good
as Congoleum's and it was more expensive to produce.").
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Congoleum were already involved in litigation over Mannington Mills'
sales of products covered by those patents. 36
The litigation between Mannington Mills and Congoleum proved to
be very long and expensive, as it involved several cases and dragged on
until 1981, when it finally settled for six million dollars. 37 During the
litigation, Mannington Mills continued attempts to work around the
Congoleum patent, even building new equipment and facilities for such
purposes, but Mannington Mills' process was never successful. 38
Congoleum's patents for chemically embossed cushioned vinyl finally
expired on December 12, 1983, and Mannington Mills celebrated the
end of its royalty payments to Congoleum, which totaled over forty
million dollars, with "one of its best parties ever."39 Given the immensity
of its battle with Congoleum, Mannington Mills had good reason for a
celebration party, and "little beverage spirits were required that
evening because everyone attending already had naturally high
spirits."40
For Congoleum, the development of its new technology came at a
time of great need. Congoleum's discovery of chemically embossed
cushioned vinyl proved to be "the savior of the company." 41 Following
Congoleum's long drought of low sales and lost money in the 1950s and
the beginning of the 1960s, Congoleum finally became profitable again
starting in 1962 when its new product was released, and Congoleum
36. See id. ("Mannington requested and received the first domestic license from
Congoleum to produce the new cushioned vinyl product, which they called Vinyl-Ease. By
November 1966, they were involved in litigation over the sale of Vinyl-Ease in foreign
countries.").
37. See id. ("The 'Congoleum vs. Mannington' lawsuit, which started in 1966, was still
dragging on in 1981. Mannington had received an adverse decision in 1977 and attempted
to reach a settlement through negotiations. The litigation was finally settled for
$6,000,000 in the fall of 1981.").
38. See id. ("Discussions were held in September 1977 for Project H-77. The purpose
was to find a way to produce cushioned vinyl flooring without using the Congoleum
chemical embossing method. The directors decided to build equipment and facilities for
the new process, recognizing that even if it failed, it would create a building and
equipment that could be used for other purposes. The process was never successful
because of registration problems, but many lessons about coating applications were
learned and the building and equipment were ready when they were needed for other
uses.").
39. Id. ('On December 12, 1983, the Congoleum patent for cushioned vinyl expired.
Soon afterward, one of the best Mannington parties ever was held to celebrate the
Christmas season and the end of royalty payments of over $40,000,000.").
40. See id. ("[O]ne of the best Mannington parties ever was held to celebrate ... the
end of royalty payments [to Congoleum] .... Little beverage spirits were required that
evening because everyone attending already had naturally high spirits.").
41. Halasz, supra note 6, at 117.
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experienced record sales just three years later.42 Congoleum's flooring
patents were a lucrative source of income, earning $35 million in
damages in 1976 from patent infringement litigation and $13.5 million
in royalties in 1977. 43
II. THE CASE: A PERFECT STORM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. Foreign Licensing Issues
Initially, Mannington Mills developed what appeared to be a
favorable licensing agreement with Congoleum. Prior to the issuance of
Congoleum's patents, chemically embossed vinyl flooring was being
manufactured and sold in the United States and abroad by not only
Congoleum but also Mannington Mills and other companies. 44 On the
day that the patents issued, Congoleum filed patent infringement suits
against Mannington Mills and two other major businesses in the
flooring industry.45 Congoleum's patent infringement suit against
Mannington Mills settled in 1968 when Mannington Mills took a
license.46 This was the first domestic license that Congoleum issued for
its new product,47 and this license also granted Mannington Mills the
right to sell the product in twenty foreign countries. 48
In light of Congoleum's subsequent license agreements with other
companies, however, Mannington Mills' licensing deal appeared less
favorable. Specifically, in early 1970, Congoleum issued a license under
its U.S. patents and twenty-six of its foreign patents to GAF
Corporation, one of Mannington Mills' competitors, for its chemically
embossed vinyl product.49 In particular, GAF was given the right to sell
in six countries where Mannington Mills was not licensed: Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Ireland, and Holland.50 Mannington
Mills wished to expand its foreign license rights and feared that it
would otherwise be "unable to compete effectively" with other
licensees. 51 The president of Mannington Mills indicated to Congoleum's
42. See id.
43. Id. at 118.
44. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir.
1979).
45. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., No. 74-1668, 1977 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12973, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 11, 1977).
46. See id.
47. OUR FIRST 75 YEARS, supra note 4.
48. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1062.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1063.
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patent counsel in November of 1970 that Mannington Mills would have
to go ahead and sell in Canada, and in his reply, Congoleum's patent
counsel insinuated that Congoleum would respond to such an act by
Mannington Mills by suing for infringement. 52
Regardless of the fact that Mannington Mills was not formally
licensed to do so, Mannington Mills continued or commenced sales of
Congoleum's patented product in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan. 53 This blatant patent infringement of Congoleum's foreign
patents was an important part of Mannington Mills' business, as
Mannington Mills' export sales accounted for about 20 percent of its
total sales in the mid-1970s, and about 80 percent of its foreign sales
were made in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.54 In light of
Mannington Mills' brash behavior, Congoleum cancelled Mannington
Mills' foreign license rights and eventually brought infringement actions
against Mannington Mills in all four countries where it had been selling
without a license.55
B. Procedural History and the Third Circuit's Opinion
In response to Congoleum's canceling of the foreign license
agreement between Mannington Mills and itself, Mannington Mills
brought suit against Congoleum in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in 1974, seeking to compel the continuation of
the foreign license agreement and also to secure license rights in the six
additional foreign countries included in Congoleum's foreign license
agreement with GAF.56 The district court found for Congoleum on this
license claim. 57 In that same case, however, Mannington Mills sought
leave to file an amended complaint setting forth Sherman Act claims.5 8
The district court granted leave for all of these Sherman Act claims
except one, which Mannington Mills subsequently filed in a separate
suit that forms the basis of this Note. 59
In this second suit, Mannington Mills alleged that (1) Congoleum
procured its twenty-six foreign patents through "fraudulent
52. Id. at 1064.
53. See id. at 1064-65.
54. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., No. 74-1668, 1977 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12973, at *17 (D.N.J. Nov. 11, 1977).
55. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1065.
56. See id.
57. See Walter S. Weinberg, Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.: A
Further Step Toward a Complete Subject Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus.
241, 246 n.19 (1980).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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representations" 60 to foreign patent offices and (2) Congoleum's
enforcement of the fraudulently obtained foreign patents in foreign
countries restrained U.S. export trade by restricting the foreign
business of Mannington and other U.S. competitors and also
demonstrated an intent to monopolize, thereby violating the Sherman
Act. 61 Mannington Mills sought treble damages and asked that
Congoleum be enjoined from enforcing its allegedly fraudulently
procured foreign patents in foreign jurisdictions. 62 The district court
dismissed Mannington Mills' antitrust claim, stating that "to enjoin
Congoleum from enforcing its foreign patents in other nations ... would
violate the act of state doctrine."63
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of
the antitrust claim and remanded. 64 In the first part of its three-part
opinion, the Third Circuit held that it did have subject matter
jurisdiction over the litigation by essentially applying the Alcoa
"intended effects" test.65 The court proceeded to analyze whether it
should decline to exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially. In the
second part of the opinion, the Third Circuit held that the act of state
doctrine does not apply to foreign patents and that the doctrine
therefore did not support dismissal of Mannington Mills' complaint. 66 In
60. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979).
Mannington Mills alleged that Congoleum made fraudulent representations in the
following general categories:
1. False statements about the reactions and performance of some of the chemical
compounds of the vinyl flooring;
2. Misrepresentation of test data;
3. Suppression of information critical to the practice of the invention;
4. Misleading statements about the status and contents of the United States patent
applications.
Id.
61. See id.; William N. Friedler, Case Comment, Antitrust Law - Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 185,
185-86 (1980); cf. Sherman Antitrust Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The complaint also alleged
that "Congoleum's false claims of priority dates were in violation of the Paris Convention
of March 20, 1883, as amended, [1962] 13 U.S.T 1, and the Pan-American Convention of
August 20, 1910, 38 Stat. 1811." Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1290. The district
court dismissed this treaty count on the ground that the treaties do not provide a private
right of action, and the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See id. at 1298-99.
62. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1291, 1296.
63. Id. at 1290.
64. Id. at 1299.
65. See id. at 1291-92; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,
443-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1294. The Third Circuit also found that the
foreign compulsion defense was not available because the foreign governments, by
issuance of the foreign patents per se, did not force Congoleum to exclude Mannington
Mills from the foreign markets. See id.
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the third part of the opinion, the Third Circuit held that international
comity considerations must be weighed in deciding whether or not to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. 67 Relying
on the approach in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America of
balancing comity factors as part of a jurisdictional test under the
Sherman Act, 68 the Third Circuit proposed its own comity factors to be
weighed and remanded the case for the development of a more adequate
record and to allow the district court to implement the comity
abstention doctrine formulated by the Third Circuit.
69
C. A Perfect Storm
Mannington Mills' sale of Congoleum's patented product in certain
foreign countries was necessary for Mannington Mills to keep the
business of its distributors and keep its foothold in the industry, despite
the fact that Mannington Mills did not have license rights in those
countries.7 0 Thereafter, Congoleum was compelled to enforce its foreign
patents against Mannington Mills to turn Congoleum's business around
and to avoid the risk of other competitors in the flooring industry
following Mannington Mills' bold example. The litigation between
Mannington Mills and Congoleum involved several fields of law.
In general, a sovereign's laws are territorial.7 1  However,
Mannington Mills, Inc. involved many international issues, including
67. See id. at 1297-98.
68. Id.
69. Id. The comity factors proposed by the Third Circuit include:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id.
70. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (3d
Cir. 1979).
71. See Donald J. Curotto, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws
and Retaliatory Legislation By Foreign Countries, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 577, 577
(1981).
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foreign patents rights, alleged monopolization of U.S. export trade,
foreign licensing issues, and allegations of fraud in dealings with foreign
countries. 72 Patent law is based strongly on territorial principles 73
because "[s]o far, no good system exists to harmonize the patchwork of
international laws and regulations for patent protection worldwide." 74
On the other hand, the Sherman Act and its legislative history are
ambiguous as to the scope of any extraterritorial jurisdiction conferred;
§ 2 of the Sherman Act in particular does not explicitly provide for or
preclude its application to conduct that takes place entirely abroad. 75
Thus, at the time of Mannington Mills, Inc., judge-made rules governed
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, and the scope of
this extraterritorial jurisdiction was in flux. 76 Foreign countries had
begun to take retaliatory measures in response to the lack of limitations
on the foreign application of the Sherman Act. 77
The litigation between Mannington Mills and Congoleum implicated
foreign patent rights and the territorial nature of patent laws, the
extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust law (at a time when this scope
was changing and uncertain), competing doctrines of jurisdiction and
abstention, and emerging international comity concerns, the
combination of which presented Judges Weis, Weiner, and Adams with
unique, complex questions about how these legal issues should interact
and be applied in a global context-a perfect storm of
extraterritoriality.7 8
72. See 595 F.2d at 1290.
73. See Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (recognizing "the
fundamental territoriality of U.S. patent law"); MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS:
LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 2 (2012) ('CThe existing fragmented patent
systems rest on the principle of territoriality ....").
74. Steven Seidenberg, Patent Peace: The PTO Creates a New Office to Harmonize the
Global Patent System, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2014, at 13.
75. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1291; Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976).
76. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1291 ("The extraterritorial application of
the Act . . . has been and continues to be the subject of lively controversy."); see also
Curotto, supra note 71, at 583, 586. Note that Mannington Mills, Inc. was decided before
the enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982),
which clarified the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.
77. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 579, 583.
78. E.g., John H. Chung, Comment, The International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of
the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371, 395 (1996) C'The Mannington decision epitomizes
the complexity surrounding Sherman Act jurisdiction over international antitrust
disputes.").
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II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S BLUNDER: WHY THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
WAS A BETTER CHOICE THAN THE NEW COMITY ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Mannington Mills, Inc. presented the Third Circuit with several
difficult questions. One of the major issues that the court had to resolve
was how to rule on the several abstention doctrines implicated by the
case. Ultimately, the court held that, as far as extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is concerned when foreign patents
are involved, the act of state doctrine does not apply, but a comity
abstention doctrine is appropriate.
It is arguable that the Third Circuit erred in its ruling. The court's
opinion fails to provide sufficient reasoning for not applying the act of
state doctrine. The act of granting a patent should have actually
qualified as an act of state, and it would have been appropriate to
employ the act of state doctrine in the Mannington Mills, Inc. case. It
was foreseeable that the creation of a comity abstention doctrine by the
Third Circuit would have only worsened the confusion surrounding
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act at the time. Also,
the act of state doctrine was a more practical choice than the comity
abstention doctrine, and, in retrospect, it is now fairly clear that the
Third Circuit would have been wiser to use the act of state doctrine
rather than create its new comity abstention doctrine.
A. Background: Act of State Doctrine
"The Act of State doctrine is a policy of judicial abstention from
inquiry into the validity of [a sovereign] act by a foreign government."79
From Underhill v. Hernandez,8 0 the case in which the act of state
doctrine was initially formulated, comes the classic U.S. statement of
the doctrine: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory."l According to earlier
expressions of the act of state doctrine, the underlying rationale of the
doctrine was that "the merits of acts by other nation-states should not
be questioned by U.S. courts based on inherent notions of sovereignty
79. 7 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, ET AL., PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 21.4 (2d ed. 2016).
80. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
81. Id. at 252. Kathleen Karelis, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling
Justice and Diplomacy on a Case-By-Case Basis, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1989);
Susan H. Kamei, Recent Decision, The Act of State Doctrine and U.S. Antitrust Law:
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 503, 509 (1980).
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and comity."82 Starting in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,83
however, a little more than a decade before Mannington Mills, Inc.,
courts had begun to develop a concomitant rationale of the act of state
doctrine that was concerned more with "preserving the 'basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation
of powers' by not hindering the Executive's conduct of foreign policy
through judicial review or oversight of foreign acts."84
B. The Third Circuit Failed to Provide Sufficient Reasoning for Not
Applying the Act of State Doctrine
The Third Circuit did not provide adequate reasoning in
Mannington Mills, Inc. for not applying the act of state doctrine to
foreign patents, especially with respect to the relationship of foreign
patents to the theories behind the doctrine. It was simply "without
apparent compelling grounds" that the Third Circuit "restrict[ed]
dramatically the act of state doctrine."85 The court seemed to rely on a
distinction between the grant of a patent and an act of expropriation,
which was the kind of act that had traditionally qualified as an act of
state under the doctrine,8 6 but the court did not expound this distinction
for purposes of the act of state doctrine.87 In addition to distinguishing
the grant of a patent from qualifying acts of state without adequate
explanation, the court also implied that the grant of a patent was
analogous to acts which had been denied act of state status.88 This was
not expressly stated, however, much less explained. Regardless of
whether the Third Circuit adequately explained the differences and
similarities of the grant of a patent with acts that do and do not qualify
under the act of state doctrine, it was inappropriate in the first place for
the court to base such a large portion of its decision on the mechanical
characterization of the act in question.8 9 Such characterizations may
82. Kamei, supra note 81, at 510 (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
303-04 (1918)).
83. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
84. Kamei, supra note 81, at 510-11 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).
85. Id. at 515.
86. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979);
Kamei, supra note 81, at 506.
87. Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 358
(1986) ("[T]he court did not elucidate the distinction, for purposes of the doctrine, between
a government's act of expropriation and a government's issuance of a patent.").
88. Kamei, supra note 81, at 506; see Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1294.
89. See Kamei, supra note 81, at 510.
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serve as helpful indicia for act of state determinations, but they should
not be treated as conclusive. 90
The Third Circuit should have evaluated the act of granting a
patent "in light of the theoretical base underlying the act of state
doctrine,"91 which is an evaluation that the court erroneously
forewent.92 The Third Circuit's act of state doctrine analysis in
Mannington Mills, Inc. seems rather conclusory, as the court held that
"the granting of the patents per se, in substance ministerial activity, is
not the kind of governmental action contemplated by the act of state
doctrine. ' 93 In dealing with a concept as amorphous as the act of state
doctrine, the Third Circuit should have been more careful to enunciate
its reasoning for why the doctrine does or does not apply to foreign
patents.94
C. The Grant of a Patent Should Qualify As an Act of State
The act of granting a patent should have been deemed to qualify as
an act of state under the act of state doctrine in Mannington Mills, Inc.
based on either the characterization of the act or the evaluation of the
act in light of the underlying rationales for the act of state doctrine. As
for characterization, a leading case from the Second Circuit in 1956 had
suggested that the act of state doctrine was applicable to foreign
trademark registrations and thus, by analogy, to patents as well.9 5
Additionally, the act of granting a patent is similar to an act of
expropriation by a government, which had traditionally qualified as an
act of state under the doctrine, 96 in that the granting of a patent is also
a sovereign act.97 The Third Circuit attempted to characterize the
90. Id. at 514.
91. Id. at 510, 514.
92. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1292-94 ("We conclude, therefore, that the
asserted act of state defense does not support dismissal of plaintiffs complaint and it does
not apply to the patents issued in the foreign countries."). The theoretical motivations
underlying the act of state doctrine are discussed only briefly at the beginning of part II of
the opinion; furthermore, that discussion is about the theoretical motivations generally
and not how they relate to the act of granting a patent. See id.
93. Id. at 1294.
94. See Kamei, supra note 81, at 515.
95. See 8 ERIC E. BENSEN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 17.3, n.130 (2d ed. 2015)
(citing Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956)).
96. See Kamei, supra note 81, at 510.
97. Uwe Fitzner, Laws and Regulations for the Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, in MICROBIAL PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS 465, 478 (Jos6 Luis Barredo ed.,
2005) ("The granting of a patent is a sovereign act; .... "); DAVID KENNETH LEARY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENETIC RESOURCES OF THE DEEP SEA 178 (2006) ("the very
act of granting a patent is a sovereign act").
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granting of a patent and expropriation differently by characterizing the
granting of a patent as a "ministerial activity" rather than an act such
as expropriation that occurs "as a result of a considered policy
determination by a government to give effect to its political and public
interests-matters that would have significant impact on American
foreign relations."98 However, the grant of patent rights is directly
related to a country's patent laws, which are considered policy
determinations by a country's government to give effect to its political
and public interests matters relating to intellectual property and
commerce, and such matters are likely to have an impact on U.S.
foreign relations with that country.
Furthermore, merely characterizing the grant of a patent as a
"ministerial activity" did not preclude the act from qualifying as an act
of state under the act of state doctrine. Certain acts could be
characterized as "ministerial" and yet still qualify for act of state status
under a less restrictive approach to the act of state doctrine. 99 Some
ministerial activities had even been characterized as acts of state under
the doctrine in prior cases. 100 In a 1964 decision, the Second Circuit
suggested that "internal administrative acts," which are comparable or
perhaps identical to ministerial activities, would warrant the act of
state defense. 10 1
In addition to the characterization of the act of granting a patent,
the evaluation of this act in light of the underlying rationales of the act
of state doctrine also shows that the grant of a patent should be given
act of state status under the doctrine. The "comity and sovereignty"
rationale 10 2 for the act of state doctrine provided support for applying
the doctrine to the grant of foreign patents because comity conflicts may
arise when U.S. courts declare valid foreign patents effectively invalid
by U.S. standards. 10 3 A foreign sovereign's act of granting a patent
would have been detrimentally affected by a ruling in a U.S. court
restricting the use of such foreign patents, 104 thereby giving rise to
98. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
99. See Kamei, supra note 81, at 515.
100. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 906, 909-
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that though the "[t]ransfer of the domicile of . .. private
corporations from one state to another [had] always been treated as a ministerial matter,"
such a transfer of domicile could qualify as an act of state under the doctrine).
101. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
102. See supra Part IV.A.
103. See Friedler, supra note 61, at 198; supra Part IV.D (explaining how enjoining
Congoleum from enforcing its foreign patents based on U.S. antitrust law would effectively
invalidate the foreign patents).
104. See Weinberg, supra note 57, at 258.
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comity conflicts and thus providing for application of the act of state
doctrine based on the "comity and sovereignty" rationale. Moreover, to
characterize the act of granting a foreign patent as a "ministerial
activity," which, according to the Third Circuit, precludes application of
the act of state doctrine, was to dismiss the possible importance of the
grant of a patent to a particular issuing country, 10 5 thus providing
further support for application of the act of state doctrine based on the
"comity and sovereignty" rationale.
The "separation of powers" rationale 0 6 for the act of state doctrine
provided support for applying the doctrine to the grant of foreign
patents as well. A U.S. court's adjudication of matters involving the
validity of foreign patents, which the act of state doctrine would have
precluded if it applied to the act of granting a patent, would likely have
led foreign countries to retaliate in ways similar to how some countries
retaliated to the expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act before it was checked by comity considerations. 07 For example, it is
very likely that vigorous foreign protest would follow the awarding of
treble damages by a U.S. court for enforcement abroad of foreign
patents. 08 Such retaliation and protest in response to judicial action
could violate the separation of powers by hindering the executive's
conduct of foreign policy.10 9 Not applying the act of state doctrine to the
act of granting a patent effectively "permit[s] the validity of the acts of
one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by courts
of another," which "'imperil[s] the amicable relations between
governments and vex[es] the peace of nations' 0110 and is thus adverse to
the concerns of the "separation of powers" rationale.
D. Act of State Doctrine, Walker Process, and Foreign Patent Validity
Assuming that the grant of a patent qualifies as an act of state
under the act of state doctrine, as argued in Part IV.C., then the next
step in determining if the act of state doctrine should be employed in a
case involving foreign patents is to determine if the validity of a foreign
patent is being adjudged in the case. (Remember from Part IV.A. that
105. Id. at 253.
106. See supra Part V.A.
107. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 579, 583; see also infra Part V.E.
108. 8 BENSEN, supra note 95, § 17.3.
109. See supra Part iV.A.
110. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (internal quotation
unsupported); see infra Part IV.D (explaining how enjoining Congoleum from enforcing its
foreign patents based on U.S. antitrust law would effectively invalidate the foreign
patents).
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the act of state doctrine is a policy of abstention from inquiring into the
validity of a qualifying act of state.) At first glance, Mannington Mills,
Inc. appears to not implicate the validity of Congoleum's foreign
patents. Mannington Mills, Inc. was not a declaratory judgment suit or
infringement suit, which courts generally abstain from adjudicating so
as to avoid deciding the validity of foreign patents."' Mannington Mills
emphasized that it was not challenging "the right of a foreign
government to confer patents under its own requirements," and
Mannington Mills "[did] not seek to have the [foreign] patents at issue
adjudged invalid."112 Rather, Mannington Mills' claims were said to
arise out of breach of standards imposed by U.S. antitrust law. 113
However, the validity of Congoleum's foreign patents was
nonetheless implicated in Mannington Mills, Inc. In the case,
Mannington Mills sought to extend the doctrine of Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.114 to foreign
patents.115 The Supreme Court held in Walker Process that the
fraudulent procurement of a domestic patent could constitute an
antitrust violation. 116 If the Walker Process doctrine were extended to
foreign patents, then Mannington Mills' claim that Congoleum
fraudulently procured foreign patents could constitute a Sherman Act
violation as alleged. If Mannington Mills were to be granted the treble
damages and injunctive relief it sought for Congoleum's enforcement
abroad of its foreign patents, then the validity of Congoleum's foreign
patents would be indirectly adjudged 1 7 and those patents would be
rendered useless because "an unenforceable patent is of little value to
an American company." 118 Thus, Mannington Mills, Inc. implicated the
legitimacy of Congoleum's foreign patents even though Mannington
Mills was not asking the court to directly adjudge their. validity
according to foreign patent laws. It would have therefore been
appropriate for the act of state doctrine to be employed in the case,
thereby preventing the Third Circuit from perceivably and effectively
111. See TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 43.
112. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 1290-91.
114. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
115. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1295.
116. Friedler, supra note 61, at 191.
117. The enforceability of a foreign patent based on a Walker Process claim under the
Sherman Act is distinct from the validity of the foreign patent under the foreign nation's
patent laws (for example, fraudulent procurement may not be grounds for invalidating the
foreign patent under the foreign nation's patent law), but a finding that a foreign patent
was fraudulently procured would undoubtedly place a cloud of suspect on the validity of
that patent.
118. Weinberg, supra note 57, at 253.
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invalidating Congoleum's foreign patents through determining whether
Congoleum should be enjoined from enforcing them abroad.
E. Background: Comity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the
Sherman Act
Comity is the principle that states should recognize and enforce
rights created by other states, provided that neither the enforcing state
nor its subjects are prejudiced by such recognition. 119 To understand the
comity abstention doctrine in Mannington Mills, Inc., it is necessary to
look at the development of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. The Sherman Act and its legislative history do not
provide any clear indication of the extraterritorial application of the Act,
so the matter was left to the courts to decide. 120 The Supreme Court
summarily applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially in United States
v. American Tobacco Co.121 in 1911.122 In United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (Alcoa),123 Judge Learned Hand formulated an "intended
effects" test for determining the jurisdiction of a court applying the
Sherman Act extraterritorially.124 A federal court has extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction under the Alcoa "intended effects" test if the
foreign activity sought to be restrained was intended to affect U.S.
foreign commerce and did have such an effect. 125 The Ninth Circuit, in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,12 6 determined that the
Alcoa "effects" test was inadequate. 127  Instead of deciding
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act based solely on
effects, the Timberlane court's landmark ruling incorporated
international comity considerations into the jurisdictional analysis by
establishing a tripartite test for jurisdiction, where the first two criteria
were derived from the Alcoa "effects" test and the third level of the test
was a comity-based balancing of foreign and U.S. interests.128
119. Lillian V. Blageff, Primer on International Litigation, 3 L. OF INrT'L TRADE § 99:1
(2016).
120. See Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1291-92; Friedler, supra note 61, at 187.
121. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
122. See Friedler, supra note 61, at 187.
123. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
124. See id. at 443-45.
125. See id. at 443-44.
126. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
127. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 582.
128. James M. Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction
on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 406-07 (1983); see also Blageff, supra note 119 ("Comity is
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F. The Third Circuit's Creation of a Comity Abstention Doctrine
Contributed to the Confusion Surrounding Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Under the Sherman Act
There was uncertainty surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act at the time that Mannington Mills, Inc. was
decided. 129 The courts were struggling to develop a test for determining
such jurisdiction. 130 Extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
had been "extremely broad" under the Alcoa "effects" test,131 but there
was an emerging trend toward the incorporation of comity
considerations into such jurisdictional decisions. 13 2
The Third Circuit went against this emerging trend. It formulated a
new test for applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially,133 and this
new test was "much different" than the test in Timberlane.134 First, the
Third Circuit, "[i]n no uncertain terms .... reaffirmed Alcoa's reasoning
as the litmus test for jurisdiction" 135 and used the Alcoa "effects" test as
the sole consideration for the finding of jurisdiction in Mannington
Mills, Inc.136 After finding that it had jurisdiction, however, the Third
Circuit then remanded the case for a consideration of comity factors
along the lines of the Timberlane test. 137 The court purportedly adopted
the jurisdictional analysis employed in Timberlane, but the approach
that the Mannington Mills, Inc. court actually took seemed to be based
on a misinterpretation of the Timberlane jurisdictional test.138 In the
Timberlane approach, international comity considerations were part of
the test to determine if the court had jurisdiction, whereas the
international comity considerations in Mannington Mills, Inc. were part
of an abstention test to determine if the court should exercise its
jurisdiction. 139 The Mannington Mills, Inc. court was the first court to
the principle that states should recognize and enforce rights created by other states,
provided that such recognition does not prejudice the state or its subjects.").
129. See Weinberg, supra note 57, at 241.
130. Friedler, supra note 61, at 185.
131. Kamei, supra note 81, at 519.
132. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 586 ("[The comity factors of complexity of the
lawsuit, the seriousness of the charges, and the recalcitrant attitude of the defaulter] were
adopted by the appellate court.")
133. See Friedler, supra note 61, at 195.
134. Curotto, supra note 71, at 585.
135. Chung, supra note 78, at 395.
136. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 584.
137. See Chung, supra note 78, at 395.
138. See Friedler, supra note 61, at 192, 196.
139. Edward T. Swaine, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States, in
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 10 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011)
("Mannington Mills, Inc.... indicated that comity analysis was not part of a threshold
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suggest that international comity was an abstention doctrine in the
realm of international antitrust law and thereby created a new test for
applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially. 140 Moreover, the court
adopted its own list of relevant comity factors to supplement the list of
factors set forth in Timberlane.
1 4 1
The creation of a new comity abstention doctrine in Mannington
Mills, Inc. by the Third Circuit likely resulted in even more confusion
surrounding the already volatile issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act at the time. The imprecise following of the
Timberlane court's approach in cases such as Mannington Mills, Inc.
"caused further uncertainty among foreign businesses and continued
foreign disapproval."142 The Third Circuit's comity abstention doctrine
was out of line with prior antitrust cases because a finding of the
existence of jurisdiction in all international antitrust cases prior to
Mannington Mills, Inc., in the absence of a recognized abstention
doctrine, had implied a mandatory extraterritorial application of the
antitrust law. 143 Even though the Third Circuit, which purportedly
adopted Timberlane's jurisdictional analysis, probably intended to
support Timberlane's argument for the incorporation of comity
considerations into decisions about extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act, the Third Circuit's creation of a new comity abstention
likely undermined Timberlane's argument instead.
The argument in the Mannington Mills, Inc. opinion for a new
comity abstention doctrine as part of a test for extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act was itself a weak argument. The
reinstating of the "effects" test weakened the Third Circuit's argument
because several standards for that test had emerged.1 44 The Mannington
Mills, Inc. opinion was further weakened by the fact that it did not have
the full support of all three judges. Judge Adams wrote a concurring
opinion in Mannington Mills, Inc. strongly advocating against the
inquiry into whether the conduct fell within the Sherman Act, but instead was more of a
discretionary factor according to which courts could abstain from proceedings."). In an
article summarizing the holding of his prior opinion in Mannington Mills, Inc., Judge Weis
acknowledged that the comity considerations prescribed in that opinion were part of an
abstention doctrine separate from the extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis. See Joseph F.
Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and
Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 926, n.118 (1989) (observing of Mannington Mills, Inc.,
the "district court had jurisdiction over antitrust suit for activities performed abroad, but
erred in exercising jurisdiction without first evaluating factors counseling against federal
court intervention").
140. See Friedler, supra note 61, at 195.
141. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 584-85.
142. Id. at 583.
143. Friedler, supra note 61, at 197, n.84.
144. See Weinberg, supra note 57, at 242.
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creation of the comity abstention doctrine. 145 The weakness of the
Mannington Mills, Inc. opinion was displayed when, in a case decided
the same year as Mannington Mills, Inc., the court in Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf and Western Industries, Inc.146 left unresolved
the issue of which test to use from Mannington Mills, Inc. for
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act: the majority's test or
the concurrence's test.147
G. The Act of State Doctrine Was the More Practical Choice
From a practical standpoint, the Third Circuit would have been
wiser to use the act of state doctrine rather than its new, self-created
comity abstention doctrine. The act of state doctrine and comity
abstention doctrine would have achieved essentially the same effect. 148
However, these two doctrines achieve this effect in different ways. The
act of state doctrine automatically bars the exercise of jurisdiction,
whereas the Third Circuit's comity abstention doctrine from
Mannington Mills, Inc. "allows either the exercise of or abstention from
that jurisdiction," depending upon the outcome of an extensive inquiry
into comity considerations. 149 In formulating its new comity abstention
doctrine, the Third Circuit considered the "realities of international
commerce,"' 50 but it does not appear as though the court considered the
reality of its new test's cumbersomeness or the practical limits of the
judiciary's competency for handling such a test.
The act of state doctrine was a more practical choice because the
Third Circuit's comity abstention doctrine was too complex from the
start. International comity doctrine in general "is not tightly
formulated; instead it is a highly discretionary interest-balancing
inquiry." 151 The comity abstention doctrine was similar to and based on
the jurisdictional test in Timberlane, which has been described as
"cumbersome, often indeterminate, conducive to lengthy and expensive
145. See 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (arguing that comity
considerations "are properly ... weighed at the outset when the court determines whether
jurisdiction vel non exists ... ").
146. 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
147. See Weinberg, supra note 57, at 262; see also 473 F. Supp. at 687-88.
148. Kamei, supra note 81, at 517 ("[A] court applying the Mannington 'comity' doctrine
can achieve the same effect as would be achieved by applying the act of state doctrine...
.11).
149. See id. at 516.
150. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297.
151. 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw §41.2a3(A) (2d ed. 2009).
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discovery, and thus burdensome to both litigants and courts."
15 2
Furthermore, Mannington Mills, Inc. appeared to suggest that a
separate balancing analysis was needed for each of the twenty-six
countries involved in the transaction. 153 In contrast, the act of state
doctrine allowed for much more efficient use of judicial resources.
The act of state doctrine was also a more practical choice because
the judiciary is ill equipped to analyze international comity factors. The
competence of judges "to evaluate the diplomatic, national security, and
international economic issues raised by the factors [of the Timberlane
test]," on which the comity abstention doctrine in Mannington Mills,
Inc. is based, is questioned by domestic and foreign judges. 54 It does not
help that the most important factors are also the most difficult to
judge.155 When a court has to weigh domestic interests versus foreign
law specifically intended to thwart those domestic interests, it is almost
impossible to balance the interests, and the judiciary, which is "limited
in its ability to make a well-reasoned analysis of complicated
international policy initiatives,"'156 is not the proper forum for balancing
such interests. v57 An analysis of the comity factors to be considered as
part of the comity abstention doctrine in Mannington Mills, Inc.
includes many areas that are completely outside the scope of judicial
inquiry and within the scope of agencies, legislative committees, and the
executive branch. 158
H. Hindsight is 20/20
It is a well-understood phenomenon that the merit of a court's
decision can often be better critiqued through a retrospective analysis of
the effects of the decision and the judiciary's reception of the decision, as
the wisdom or folly of a court's decision is usually not immediately
evident. In the case of Mannington Mills, Inc., hindsight shows that the
Third Circuit's decision to formulate a new comity abstention doctrine
152. 1A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 273c2, at 383 (2d ed. 2000).
153. See 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 151, at §41.2al, n.24; Mannington Mills, Inc.,
595 F.2d at 1298 ("Although the plaintiff would prefer to have the matter resolved as a
unitary one, that cannot be done when the individual interests and policies of each of the
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rather than utilize the act of state doctrine was perhaps the wrong
choice. For example, the creation of the comity abstention doctrine by
the Third Circuit has not had a profound effect on extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. There is little to distinguish the results
of cases like Mannington Mills, Inc., which anguish over comity, from
the cases purporting to apply a straight "effects" test.159 The type of
multifactor approach used in Mannington Mills, Inc. to deal with the
application of the Sherman Act to anticompetitive activities outside the
United States "faded from the antitrust scene in the face of
congressional action to clarify the reach of the Sherman Act, and
Supreme Court opinions dealing with the reach of the Sherman Act,
which, for the most part, did not employ this approach."160
Furthermore, the Third Circuit's holding in Mannington Mills, Inc.
that the act of state doctrine does not apply to the granting of foreign
patents has not been well received by the courts. Though there have
been some critics of applying the act of state doctrine to foreign patent
cases, "the application of the doctrine to patents has survived the
criticism to date," as courts still use the act of state doctrine to explain
their abstention from deciding the validity of foreign patents.1 61 In a
recent case, the Federal Circuit did not bar the application of the act of
state doctrine from to foreign patents but rather "relied heavily on the
argument that foreign patent claims cannot be entertained by courts in
the United States because of the act of state doctrine." 162 Mannington
Mills, Inc. is cited mostly as an outlier to show that not all courts have
chosen to apply the act of state doctrine to foreign patents. 163
The insignificant impact of the comity abstention doctrine created in
Mannington Mills, Inc. and the judiciary's hesitancy to adopt the
Mannington Mills, Inc. court's holding regarding the nonapplicability of
the act of state doctrine to foreign patents both support the argument in
this Note that the Third Circuit should have employed the act of state
doctrine rather than create its new comity abstention doctrine.
Hindsight is, after all, 20/20.
159. 2 HOVENKAMPETAL., supra note 151, at §41.2al, n.21.
160. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341,
394-95 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
161. TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 43-44.
162. Id. at 67.
163. See, e.g., id. (citing Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979), as an example that "[n]ot all courts agree that the act of state doctrine applies to
foreign patents").
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IV. POTENTIAL INFLUENCES ON THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION TO
CREATE THE NEW COMITY ABSTENTION DOCTRINE RATHER THAN USE THE
ACT OF STATE OF DOCTRINE
One possible explanation for why the Third Circuit chose to create a
new comity abstention doctrine rather than employ the established act
of state doctrine could be that the court was seeking to shape the
changing landscape of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act. By providing its new comity abstention doctrine, the Third Circuit
might have sought to offer U.S. courts another means of limiting the
application of the Sherman Act abroad. At the time that Mannington
Mills, Inc. was decided, there was an emerging trend of limiting
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act through incorporation of
comity considerations into those jurisdictional decisions. 16 4 By creating
a comity abstention doctrine, the Third Circuit may have intended to
support this trend toward comity considerations by, for example,
supporting the Timberlane approach on which the comity abstention
doctrine was purportedly based. 165
The Third Circuit may have sought to limit extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to ease tensions between the United
States and foreign countries over extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws. It
is conceivable that, in creating a comity abstention doctrine, the Third
Circuit's intentions were to deter foreign countries from taking
retaliatory measures in response to U.S. courts exercising broad
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Some foreign
countries had indeed already taken such retaliatory measures.
166
Another potential influence on the Third Circuit's decision might
have been a bias that favored extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. It has been argued that "[blecause of the highly
discretionary nature of the subject matter jurisdiction characterization,
its application inherently biases courts' extraterritoriality analyses."'
16 7
This inherent across-the-board bias purportedly makes "the
extraterritoriality analysis unduly outcome determinative, in favor of
applying the federal antitrust laws extraterritorially.'l
6 8
164. See Curotto, supra note 71, at 586-87.
165. See 595 F.2d at 1297.
166. See, e.g., Curotto, supra note 71, at 592. The United Kingdom enacted the
Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980 to create a disincentive to the extraterritorial
reach of various foreign laws. See id.
167. John A. Trenor, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1607 (1995).
168. Id.
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The Third Circuit's opinion in Mannington Mills, Inc. supports the
hypothesis that courts favored extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act. By creating and employing the comity abstention
doctrine, the Third Circuit at least gave Mannington Mills a chance to
have its complaint heard. If the Third Circuit would have decided that
the act of state doctrine was applicable in this case, then Mannington
Mills' complaint would have been automatically dismissed. Moreover,
the likelihood of dismissal was much lower under the Mannington Mills,
Inc. approach to abstention than it would have been under the
Timberlane approach because under the Mannington Mills, Inc.
approach, "[o]nly a strong foreign nation interest [would have] suffice[d]
for dismissal."'169
CONCLUSION
This Note tells the story of a case that is very unique and complex
both in its history and its legal doctrine. By implicating antitrust law
and patent law in a global context, given the legal landscape at the
time, Mannington Mills, Inc. created a perfect storm of
extraterritoriality, and this Note argues that the Third Circuit should
have foregone the creation of a new comity abstention doctrine and
instead applied the act of state doctrine to foreign patents. The grant of
a patent should have been deemed an act of state, and the Third Circuit
should have appropriately employed the act of state doctrine to protect
foreign patent validity from an extension of Walker Process. 170 The
Third Circuit failed to provide sufficient reasoning for not applying the
act of state doctrine to Congoleum's foreign patents. Additionally, the
newly created comity abstention doctrine led to further confusion of the
matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. The act of
state doctrine was also a better choice than the comity abstention
doctrine on the bases of practicality and hindsight.
Two potential explanations for the Third Circuit's choice to create a
comity abstention doctrine and not apply the act of state doctrine to
foreign patents are that the Third Circuit may have sought to use
Mannington Mills, Inc. to shape the changing landscape of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and that there
existed an inherent bias by the courts in favor of extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act.
169. Curotto, supra note 71, at 591.
170. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
